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THE GROWING DARK SIDE OF
CYBERSPACE ( . . . AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT)
Ronald Deibert*
INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace—the
global
environment
of
digital
communications—surrounds and embodies us entirely, 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week. We are always on, always connected: emailing,
texting, searching, networking, and sharing are all now as
commonplace as eating, breathing, and sleeping. With the emerging
“Internet of things,” devices interact online independent of our direct
control: our fridges, pacemakers, and automobiles, alive and
networking with each other.
Governments around the world have seen these technologies
as the recipe for social empowerment and development. Billions have
been spent on wiring communities even in the most isolated areas,
under the assumption that access to knowledge and networking are
the keys to economic growth.1 Numerous success stories provide
* Director of the Citizen Lab and Canada Centre for Global Security
Studies, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. Thanks to Masashi
Crete-Nishihata, Adam Senft, and Marianne Lau for assistance, and to Rafal
Rohozinski for helping to develop some concepts in the first half of the article.
Support for research provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation.
1 See PETER STENBERG ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, BROADBAND INTERNET’S VALUE FOR RURAL AMERICA, iii, iv, 2122 (2009) (showing statistically how economically important broadband access is to
rural communities in America). See also Jim Hopkins, In Rural Areas, Fast Net Access
Vital,
but
Elusive,
USA
TODAY,
Nov.
12,
2001,
at
4E,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/bonus/1101/rural.htm
(showing
that
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ample evidence for these assumptions, from crowd-sourcing disaster
and humanitarian relief operations to farmers using mobile apps to
access real-time data on markets.2
But there is a dark side to cyberspace—hidden contests and
malicious threats—that is growing like a disease from the inside-out.
This disease has many symptoms, and is being reinforced by a
multiplicity of disparate but mutually reinforcing causes. Some of
these driving forces are unintended byproducts of the new digital
universe into which we have thrust ourselves with blind acceptance;
others are more sinister and represent deliberate manipulations of the
new opportunities for exploitation that have been created. I outline
six of these driving forces below.3
As ominous as the dark side of cyberspace may be, our
collective reactions to it are just as ominous—and can easily become
the darkest driving force of them all should we over-react. Cyber
security has vaulted itself to the top of the international policy
agenda—now an urgent priority, ranked by some as high as nuclear
weapons proliferation and terrorism.4 Under extreme conditions,
federal and state subsidized loans are helping internet business development and
tech education in previously inaccessible rural areas); Press Release, World Bank,
Remote Rural Communities in Papua New Guinea to Benefit from Improved Access to
Telecommunications, World Bank Press Release 2011/635/EAp (July 22, 2010),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2010/07/22/remote-rural-communitiespapua-new-guinea-benefit-improved-access-telecommunications (using a $15
million dollar loan from the World Bank, an organization can provide public
internet access to over 420,000 people in Papua New Guinea).
2 See, e.g., Hundreds of Thousands Back Iran Revolution, BBC NEWS, Feb. 11,
2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8509765.stm (focusing young Iranians, and
bringing awareness to the rest of the world using social media and twitter during
the Iranian “Green” Revolution); #EgyPresElex - How election day in #Egypt was shared
via social media, GUARDIAN (STORIFY) (May 23, 2012), http://storify.com/
guardian/egypreselex-top-tweets-from-election-day (pictures and social media
involved the world in the Egyptian election).
3 See Ronald Deibert, Cybersecurity, in FOREIGN POLICY ASS’N, GREAT
DECISIONS 4 (2012). See also Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Contesting
Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, in ACCESS CONTESTED: SECURITY,
IDENTITY, AND RESISTANCE IN ASIAN CYBERSPACE 21 (Deibert et al. eds., 2012)
(drawing from parts of these two works in the following sections).
4 Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has called cyber
security “a profound threat to this country, to its future, its economy, and its very
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politicians can be tempted by simplistic and radical solutions. Fear is
becoming the dominant driving force for a wide-ranging movement
to shape, control, and possibly subvert cyberspace. As Samuel
Coleridge once said, “In politics, what begins in fear usually ends in
folly.” In order to protect and preserve cyberspace as a secure and
open communications environment—dealing simultaneously with the
dark side while also benefiting from its positive effects—a return to
some timeless principles may provide the best solution.
I. INTO THE CLOUDS
Cyberspace has always been characterized by change. But
almost imperceptibly there has been a major shift in the constitution
of cyberspace within the last several years with the rise of social
networking, the shift to cloud computing, and the rapid emergence of
mobile forms of connectivity. Although each of these developments
are unique, together they have the combined effect of taking users
out of an older communications paradigm and into new ones,
governed by different rules, norms, and principles—not all of them
necessarily benign.
For example, cloud computing has un-tethered PCs and
operating systems into virtualized infrastructures. Data that used to
be stored on our desktops and in our filing cabinets have evaporated
into “the clouds.” This shift has lowered the cost of access to highpowered computing facilities but raises significant issues with respect
to jurisdiction, security and data privacy.
Very few citizens outside of the United States realize, for
example, that their data stored on Google, even those physically
residing on machines located in their own country, are subject to the
being.” 158 CONG. REC. S618 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2012) (statement of Senator
Collins). Similarly, Robert Muller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), testified to Congress in January 2012 that “Counterterrorism—stopping
terrorist attacks—with the FBI is the present number one priority. But down the
road, the cyber threat, which cuts across all [FBI] programs, will be the number one
threat to the country.” Jason Ryan, FBI Director Says Cyberthreats Will Surpass Threat
from Terrorists, ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 31, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/
politics/2012/01/fbi-director-says-cyberthreat-will-surpass-threat-from-terrorists/.
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U.S. Patriot Act because Google is headquartered in the United
States and the Act compels Google to turn over its data when
required no matter where it is stored.5 For that reason, some
European countries are now debating laws that will ban public
officials from using Google or other cloud services that could put
their citizen’s personal data at risk.6
Likewise, mobile connectivity and social networking have
given us an instant awareness of each other’s thoughts, habits, and
activities, while entrusting a massive and unprecedented amount of
personally identifiable data to third parties. Our personal lives have
been turned inside-out with the result that we can be tracked in time
and space with a degree of precision that would make the greatest
tyrants of days past envious—all by our own consent. Mobile devices
and their accoutrement of “apps” are examples of what Jonathan
Zittrain calls “tethered appliances” —they corral us into walled
gardens controlled by private companies with potential repercussions
for the positive networking effects of a borderless Internet.7
II. RISE OF THE SOUTH AND THE EAST
These technological changes are occurring alongside a major
demographic shift in cyberspace, as a growing base of users come
5 Andy Greenberg, U.S. Government Requests for Google Users’ Private Data
Jump 37% In One Year, FORBES.COM
(June 17, 2012, 11:01 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/06/17/u-s-governmentrequests-for-google-users-private-data-spike-37-in-one-year/(showing that the U.S.
Government made 6,321 information requests in 6 months during 2011, a
significant increase from the number of requests made in 2009 and 2010, and that
Google also has received information requests from foreign governments).
6 See, e.g., Malija Palmer, Google Faces Norwegian Public Sector Ban, FIN.
TIMES TECH BLOG (Jan. 24, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/techblog/2012/01/google-faces-norwegian-public-sector-ban/#axzz1kfe50lGX
(“Norwegian public sector organizations will be banned from using Google Apps
after the Norwegian data protection authorities ruled that the service could put
citizen’s personal data at risk. The data protection authority said that Google Apps
did not comply with Norwegian privacy laws because there was insufficient
information about where the data was being kept.”).
7 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET – AND HOW TO
STOP IT 63, 105, 101-27, 129, 149-50, 181, 193 (2008).
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from the global South—those countries that constitute the least
developed in the world. The Internet may have been born in the
West but its future will almost certainly be decided elsewhere. Today,
North America and Europe combined make up less than 35 percent
of all Internet users.8 The Asian region comprises 45 percent of the
world’s Internet population (the most by region),9 but it ranks only
sixth in terms of penetration as a percentage of population, meaning
that there is an enormous group yet to be connected, most of them
young.
Some of the fastest growth is happening among the world’s
weakest states and zones of conflict, where semi-authoritarianism or
organized crime are prevailing characteristics: Africa, the Middle East,
and Latin America. How burgeoning populations in these zones will
use and shape the technology is an open question. For example, the
young netizens who launched the Arab Spring were born into a world
of satellite broadcasts, mobile phones, and Internet cafes. They
were plugged in to the digital world, and able to rapidly exploit viral
networks in ways that were difficult for authorities to anticipate and
control. On the other hand, among the most innovative users of
social networking and mobile technologies in Latin America today
are the drug cartels, which use these very same tools to instill fear in
citizens and lawmakers, intimidate journalists, and ultimately suppress
free speech.10 Technology’s many uses are unpredictable and often
contrary to the designer’s original intent.
To understand how and in what ways cyberspace will be
characterized in years to come we need to closely analyze innovation
that is coming from the global South, and from the users of cities like
Tegucigalpa, Nairobi, and Shanghai. If the Californian culture of
libertarianism and individual entrepreneurship defined the early
history of cyberspace, we should be asking ourselves what the future
8 MINIWATTS MARKETING GROUP, INTERNET WORLD STATS: USAGE
POPULATION STATISTICS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last
updated Nov. 6, 2012).
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., Ashley Fantz, The Mexico Drug War: Bodies for Billions,
CNN.COM (Jan. 20, 2011, 9:03 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/15/world
/mexico-drug-war-essay/index.html (describing how Mexican drug cartels are
beheading journalists, and using the internet and blogs to disseminate propaganda).
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of cyberspace holds as the centre of gravity for usage and innovation
shifts to the global South.
III. THE GROWING MENACE OF CYBER CRIME
Cyber crime has been a part of cyberspace since the origins of
the Internet itself. However, its growth and complexity has become
explosive in recent years. The economy of cyber crime has morphed
from small and isolated acts undertaken by lone “basement”
criminals to a diversified, segmented and highly professionalized
transnational enterprise worth billions annually.11 Security companies
now routinely receive new samples of malicious software on the
order of tens of thousands each day. Botnets that can be used to
engage in denial of service attacks against any target can be rented
from public forums and websites for as little as one hundred dollars.
Some offer 24/7 technical help. Security operations centers that
maintain network security for banks and enterprises face millions of
cyber crime incidents each week.12

See generally MISHA GLENNY, DARK MARKET: CYBERTHIEVES, COPS,
YOU (2011) (studying and describing the important players and the
complexities of modern cybercrime).
12 See Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber
Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 201-02 (2009) (The U.S.
Department of Defense says more than 3 million attacks have occurred every year
since 2008). See also David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Rise Is Seen in Cyberattacks
Targeting U.S. Infrastructure, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2012, at A8,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/us/cyberattacks-are-up-national-securitychief-says.html (“The top American military official responsible for defending the
United States against cyberattacks said Thursday that there had been a 17-fold
increase in computer attacks on American infrastructure between 2009 and 2011,
initiated by criminal gangs, hackers and other nations.”); Robert Koenig, With Cyber
Attack Threat Rising: Senate Bill Falters, ST. LOUIS BEACON, July 31, 2012,
https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/26295/senate_debates_cyber_security
(“This month, the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Cybersecurity Task Force reported
that more than 50,000 cyberattacks on private or government networks were
reported to the DHS [Department of Homeland Security] between last fall and
February – 86 of those aimed at critical infrastructure networks.”); Too Many Cyber
Attacks Hushed Up, AFP, July 19, 2012, http://www.google.com/
hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jyKNZaQg5lvAoeciyPgXmh0ScuSA
(showing
11
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The reasons for this sudden surge in cyber crime can be
connected back to the previous two drivers.13 First, our expanding
and constantly evolving communications systems have emerged so
quickly that organizations and individuals have yet to adapt proper
security practices and policies. We have created a hypermedia
environment characterized by constant innovation from the edges,
extensive social sharing of data, and mobile networking from
multiple platforms and locations. We have immersed ourselves and
entrusted our information to “clouds” and social networking services
operated by thousands of companies of all shapes, sizes, and
geographic locations. In doing so, we have unintentionally opened up
endlessly multiplying opportunities for criminal exploitation.
Cyber crime thrives as well in part because of a lack of
controls. Cyber criminals are able to reap a digital harvest from across
the globe, while hiding locally in jurisdictions safe from law
enforcement agencies protecting victims’ interests. Cyber crime
moves at the speed of electrons; international law enforcement
cooperation moves at the speed of bureaucratic institutions. It is
almost routine now to hear about cyber criminals living openly in
places like St. Petersburg, Russia, practically exalted as tech
entrepreneurs in an underworld of illicit innovation that shows no
sign of abatement.
IV. FROM CRIME TO ESPIONAGE AND BEYOND
Cyber crime is a major nuisance and growing economic cost.
But what is most concerning is the way the worlds of cyber crime are
blurring into acts of espionage, sabotage and even warfare. Nearly
every day we hear of high-level cyber breaches against government
departments, private companies, and other infrastructure.14 The
the government is aware that the United States combats many more cyber attacks
than reported because private firms keep cyber attack information secret).
13 See generally Ron Deibert and R. Rohozinski, Meet Koobface, Facebook’s
Evil
Doppelganger,
GLOBE
&
MAIL,
Nov.
12,
2010,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/time-to-lead/internet/meetkoobface-facebooks-evil-doppelgnger/article1795650/page2/.
14 See, e.g., Jill R. Aitoro, EPA Security Breach Exposes Personal Information of
8,000 People, WASH. BUS. J., Aug. 2, 2012, http://www.bizjournals.com/washington
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Citizen Lab, at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global
Affairs, has been involved in investigating several of these cases, two
of which were published as major reports: Tracking Ghostnet15 and its
follow on, Shadows in the Cloud.16 The victims uncovered in the
reports, all compromised by Chinese-based perpetrators, ranged from
major defense contractors and global media, to government agencies,
ministries of foreign affairs, embassies and international
organizations, like the United Nations.
Most of these types of incidents can be categorized as
“espionage”: they seek to gather information, either of a proprietary
or national security sort, through clandestine means. Of even greater
concern are those that aim to cause damage. Recently a New York
Times report revealed that the United States and Israel were
responsible for the Stuxnet virus, which sabotaged air-gapped Iranian
nuclear enrichment facilities.17 If true, the attack would represent the
first time governments have taken responsibility for a cyber attack on
a critical infrastructure: a de facto act of war through cyberspace.18

/news/2012/08/02/epa-security-breach-exposes-personal.html (explaining how an
EPA data breach, compromising very personal information, was likely caused by a
virus in an e-mail attachment).
15 INFORMATION
WARFARE MONITOR, TRACKING GHOSTNET:
INVESTIGATING A CYBER ESPIONAGE NETWORK (2009), http://www.scribd.com/
doc/13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber-Espionage-Network.
16 INFORMATION
WARFARE
MONITOR
&
SHADOWSERVER
FOUNDATION, SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD: INVESTIGATING CYBER ESPIONAGE 2.0
(2010), http://www.nartv.org/mirror/shadows-in-the-cloud.pdf.
17 David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01
/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?page
wanted=all.
18 See id. See also Christopher C. Joyner & Catherine Lotrionte, Information
Warfare as International Coercion: Elements of a Legal Framework, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 825,
850 (2001) (arguing that cyber attacks that directly and purposefully cause innocent
deaths and destruction of property violate contemporary prohibitions on the use of
force); Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL ST. J.,
May 31, 2011, at A1 (“The Pentagon has concluded that computer sabotage
coming from another country can constitute an act of war, a finding that for the
first time opens the door for the U.S. to respond using traditional military force.”).
But cf. Shackelford, supra note 12, at 195-99, 201, 217-19 (examining difficulty in
defining cyber attacks as “acts of war” under traditional international law).
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What all of these breaches and attacks share in common is
that their basic techniques are largely indistinguishable from those
used by cyber criminals. Even in spite of its sophisticated effects,
Stuxnet has been described as a “Frankenstein” of existing cyber
crime methods and tradecraft.19 Many actors now see the growing
underbelly of cyber crime as a strategic vector for the exercise of
state-based and corporate espionage. Hidden in the shadows of lowlevel thuggery and economic crime, in other words, are more serious
and potentially devastating operations: undertaking malicious acts of
sabotage against critical infrastructure, like nuclear enrichment
facilities and power plants.
The growth of cybercrime is thus much more than a
persistent nuisance; it has become a highly ranked risk factor for
governments and businesses. The consequences of this exploding
threat vector are going to be numerous and wide-ranging, leading
(among other things) to pressures for greater state regulation,
intervention, and even exploitation—a fifth driver to which I now
turn.
V. THE “STATE” COMES KNOCKING
These four drivers are happening simultaneously with a sea
change in the way that governments approach cyberspace. Whereas
once the dominant metaphor of Internet regulation was “hands off,”
today the dominant metaphor is one of intervention, control,
assertion of state power, and increasingly geopolitical contestation
over the domain of cyberspace itself. States are knocking on the
doors of cyberspace governance.
For example, the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), which
documents Internet content filtering worldwide, has tracked a growth
of Internet censorship from a handful of countries in the early 2000s
when it started to more than 40 today. ONI estimates as many as 960

James P. Farwell & Rafal Rohozinski, Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber
War, 53 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY 23, 25 (2011).
19
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million people are living in jurisdictions that censor the Internet –
almost half (47%) the entire Internet population worldwide.20
The ONI’s research has also shown states becoming much
more adept at using what have been dubbed second and third
generation techniques of cyberspace control.21 These include
implementing tighter content control regulations, or subjecting the
Internet to more traditional media and publication laws. More
nefarious are examples of governments engaging in offensive
information operations, including disabling opposition sites through
denial of service or other attacks, or using pro-government bloggers
as a way of directly competing in the information space.
While conventional wisdom has long assumed authoritarian
regimes would wither in the face of the Internet (and some in the
Middle East and North Africa appear to have done just that) many
show a resilience that belies the conventional wisdom. Tunisia and
Egypt may have succumbed to Facebook-enabled protestors, but
China, Vietnam, Syria, Iran, Belarus and others have successfully
employed second and third generation control techniques to
penetrate and immobilize opposition, cultivating a climate of fear and
self-censorship.
It would be a mistake to see the growing assertion of state
power in cyberspace as solely an authoritarian phenomenon. The
reality is much more complex. The norms of cyberspace controls, in
fact, are being driven and legitimized just as much by liberal
democratic countries as others. Many liberal democratic governments
have enacted or are proposing Internet content filtering, mostly for
copyright, pornography, or content deemed to be hateful or inciting
of violence.22 Most liberal democratic governments have also pushed
20 ONI Team, Global Internet Filtering in 2012 at a Glance, THE OPENNET
INITIATIVE (Apr. 3, 2012), http://opennet.net/blog/2012/04/global-internetfiltering-2012-glance.
21 See ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND
RULE IN CYBERSPACE (Ronald Deibert et al., eds., 2010).
22 See, e.g., Michael J. Brown, The Children’s Internet Protection Act: A Denial
of A Student’s Opportunity to Learn in A Technology-Rich Environment, 19 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 789, 791 (2003) (state legislation requiring schools to use computer software
to prevent children from viewing pornography as part of the Children’s Internet
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for new surveillance powers, downloading responsibilities for
collection of data to private sector actors while relaxing judicial
oversight of sharing with law enforcement and intelligence agencies.23
They are also developing offensive information operations of their
own. For example, the United States and many other western
countries have stood up within their armed forces cyber commands
and talk openly about fighting and winning wars in this domain (as
the Stuxnet revelations show).24
VI. THE GROWING CYBER SECURITY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Not surprisingly a huge industrial sector has sprouted that
serves these growing pressures to secure cyberspace, a market now
estimated to be on the order of tens of billions of dollars annually.25
Citizen Lab and its partners have uncovered over the years that many
of the countries that censor the Internet rely on products and
services developed by western manufacturers: Smart Filter in Iran in
2005, Fortinet in Burma in 2006, Websense in Yemen, Tunisia, and
the United Arab Emirates in 2008 and 2009.26 A more recent Citizen
Lab report identified that devices manufactured by Blue Coat were
being used in Burma and also Syria possibly to help identify particular
types of communication traffic associated with pro-democracy
Protection Act of 2001); Raymond Colitt & Fernando Exman, Google in Deal with
Brazil to Fight Child Porn, REUTERS, Jul. 2, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2008/07/02/us-brazil-google-pornography-idUSN0237672120080702
(signing an agreement with Brazil Prosecutors, Google agrees to help filter access
to child porn and gather evidence against perpetrators).
23 See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace,
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1115-18, 1128-34, 1139-42 (2005) (arguing that the
U.S. government has allowed and supported private sector entities to control the
internet and limit free speech); Greenberg, supra note 5; Colitt & Exman, supra note
22.
24 See Sanger, supra note 17; see also Gorman & Barnes, supra note 18.
25 See Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, The New Cyber MilitaryIndustrial Complex, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 28, 2011, http://www.theglobe
andmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/the-new-cyber-military-industrial-complex/
article1957159/.
26 See Helmi Noman & Jillian C. York, West Censoring East: The Use of
Western Technologies by Middle East Censors 2010-2011, THE OPENNET INITIATIVE 120,
(Mar.
2011),
http://opennet.net/west-censoring-east-the-use-westerntechnologies-middle-east-censors-2010-2011.
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activists—in the context of what many consider to be crimes against
humanity occurring in that country.27 It has also published several
reports about a Canadian company, Netsweeper that sells censorship
products and services to ISPs in Yemen, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates. The Guelph, Ontario based company’s product helps block
access to human rights information, news, gay and lesbian
information, and information critical of the regimes.28
But the research has only picked at the surface of a major
field. Products that provide advanced deep pack inspection, content
filtering, social network mining, cell phone tracking, and even
computer network exploitation capabilities are being developed by
U.S., Canadian, and European firms, and marketed worldwide to
regimes seeking to limit democratic participation, isolate and identify
opposition, and infiltrate meddlesome adversaries abroad. A cyber
security industrial complex has mushroomed that services the
assertion of state power and the growing arms race in cyberspace.
VII. MUTUAL RESTRAINT, NOT OVERREACTION
The growing dark side of cyberspace represents deeply rooted
social forces that are not easily reversible. These driving forces now
are poised to subvert the domain entirely through a spiraling arms
race, the imposition of state-based controls, or by partitioning into
walled gardens.
As the imperatives to regulate, secure, and control cyberspace
grow daily, we risk degrading or even destroying what made
cyberspace so unique in the first place. In the face of these urgent
issues and real threats, policymakers may be tempted to adopt
extreme solutions that end up throwing out the baby with the
bathwater or lowering the normative bar for what is seen as
27 See The Citizen Lab, Behind Blue Coat: Investigations of Commercial Filtering
in Syria and Burma (2011), https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/07/01-2011-behindbluecoat.pdf.
28 See Helmi Norman, When a Canadian Company Decides What Citizens in the
Middle East Can Access Online, THE OPENNET INITIATIVE (May 16, 2011),
http://opennet.net/blog/2011/05/when-a-canadian-company-decides-whatcitizens-middle-east-can-access-online.
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acceptable practice in cyberspace. Before extreme solutions are
adopted, we need to be careful to premise our actions on core values
that underpin cyberspace itself: ensuring that it remains an open and
dynamic communications system for citizens the world over. There
are alternative approaches to securing cyberspace in this manner that
have yet to be fully considered.
VIII. DISTRIBUTED SECURITY FOR A GLOBAL CYBER COMMONS
There is an instinctive tendency related to international
security discussions to default to the tradition of Realism, with its
accompanying characteristics of state-centrism, top-down hierarchical
controls, and a defensive perimeter to the threats outside. As
compelling as this tradition may be, it fits awkwardly in a world
where divisions between inside and outside are blurred, threats can
emerge as easily within as without, and that which requires
securing—namely cyberspace—is a globally networked commons of
information almost entirely in the hands of the private sector.
Moreover, this model privileges state-based agencies, like the
National Security Agency, as lead actors in the security of cyberspace,
which can create awkward privacy concerns in domestic settings
while fueling reciprocal suspicions on an international scale.
One alternative approach to security that meshes with the
core values and decentralized architecture of an open but secure
cyberspace and has a long pedigree in political philosophy might be
referred to as the “distributed” approach. Distributed security is not a
new concept. It finds roots in political orders reaching back to
ancient Greece and the Roman republic, and the late medieval, early
Renaissance trade-based systems exemplified by the Venetians, the
Dutch, and the English. As the political scientist Daniel Deudny has
argued, distributed security finds its fullest expression in the founding
of the early United States of America and the writings of the political
philosophers associated with it, such as Montesquieu, Publius and
others.29 Although multi-faceted and complex, distributed security
starts from the foundation of building structures that help mitigate
See DANIEL H. DEUDNEY, BOUNDING POWER: REPUBLICAN
SECURITY THEORY FROM THE POLIS TO THE GLOBAL VILLAGE (2007).
29
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unchecked and concentrated political power, both domestically and
internationally. It puts forward “negarchy” as an alternative to the
twin evils of “hierarchy” and “anarchy.”
At the core of the distributed security model are several key
principles, which in turn can form the basis for the pillars of global
cyber security policy: mixture, division, and restraint. Mixture refers
to the intentional combination of multiple actors with governance
roles and responsibilities in a shared space. Division refers to a design
principle that no one of these actors is able to control the space in
question without the cooperation and consent of others. As an
approach to global cyberspace security and governance, these can
provide a more robust foundation for the empty euphemism of
“multi-stakeholderism,” and a principle upon which to counter
growing calls for a single global governing body for cyberspace.
Citizens, the private sector, and governments all have an important
role to play in securing and governing cyberspace—but none to the
exclusion or preeminence of the others. Mixture and division are the
principles upon which this justification can be made.
Principles of restraint are perhaps the most important of
those associated with distributed security, and arguably the most
threatened by over-reaction today. Securing cyberspace requires a
reinforcement of, rather than relaxation of restraint on power,
including checks and balances on governments, law enforcement and
intelligence agencies as well as the private sector. In an environment
of Big Data,30 in which so much personal information is entrusted to
third parties, oversight mechanisms on government agencies are
essential.
Principles of restraint—articulated as “mutual restraint” —
can also help inform growing discussions at an international level
30 See Gillian Tett, Big Data is Watching You, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2012,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/97cffaf0-e1b5-11e1-92f5-00144feab49a.html#
axzz23GKg7aVr; Michelle X. Zhou, Big Data: Good for Business, Useful to You,
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 7, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelle-xzhou/ibm-big-data-good-for-business_b_1752210.html; Warwick Ashford, Big
Data Analytics Can Reduce Cyber Risks, Says ISF, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Aug. 1,
2012, 2:34 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240160679/Big-dataanalytics-can-reduce-cyber-risks-says-ISF.
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concerning confidence and security building measures among states
in cyberspace. The dangerous possibilities of escalation in cyberspace
are real; to counter them, governments need to self-limit and check
each other’s behavior in mutually transparent ways. Here, the link in
the distributed security model between domestic and international
processes is exceptionally clear. The more checks placed on
concentrated power at a domestic level, the more adversaries abroad
have confidence in each other’s intentions.
Distributed security also describes the most efficient and
widely respected approach to security in the computer science and
engineering circles. Here it is important to remind ourselves that in
spite of the threats, cyberspace runs well and largely without
persistent disruption. On a technical level, this efficiency is founded
on open and distributed networks of local engineers who share
information as peers in a community of practice that has its roots in
the University system31 (itself, a product of the liberal philosophy
upon which distributed security rests). Rather than abolish this
system for another, more top-down approach, we should find ways
to buttress and amplify it.
The securitization of cyberspace may be inevitable, but what
form that security takes is not. As the securing of cyberspace unfolds,
ensuring basic principles of transparency, accountability, and mutual
restraint will be critical.
We are at a watershed moment, where decisions could take us
down a path where cyberspace continues to evolve into a global
commons that empowers individuals through access to information,
freedom of speech and association, or down another towards its
eventual demise. Developing models of cyber security that deal with
the dark side, while preserving our highest aspirations as citizens, is
now an urgent imperative on a planetary scale.

See generally PETER SCOTT, THE MEANINGS OF MASS HIGHER
EDUCATION (1995) (explaining the evolution of university education system from
an elite and closed off institution to an open forum for the masses).
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